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Abstract
The ‘limits of markets’ debate broadly concerns the question of when it is (im)permissible to have a market in some good. 
Markets can be of tremendous benefit to society, but many have felt that certain goods should not be for sale (e.g., sex, 
kidneys, bombs). Their sale is argued to be corrupting, exploitative, or to express a form of disrespect. In Markets without 
Limits, Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski have recently argued to the contrary: For any good, as long as it is permissible 
to give it for free, then it is permissible to give it for money. Their thesis has led to a number of engaging objections, and I 
leverage recent work on the nature of feasibility within political philosophy to offer a new challenge.
I argue that feasibility offers a constraint on which markets can be permissibly implemented. Though it may be possible to 
create a morally acceptable version of an otherwise repugnant market, some of these markets may be infeasible, and so we 
are not permitted to implement them. After laying out this challenge, I consider several replies. They concern the relevance 
of feasibility, and whether any markets really are infeasible. This provides an opportunity to explore the dangers of pursuing 
the infeasible and with markets generally. I conclude by considering what might lead us to pursue these markets despite their 
infeasibility, or how knowledge of infeasibility may prove useful regardless.
Keywords Limits of markets · Moral limits of markets · Feasibility · Risk
Introduction
Markets of all kinds have proven to be of tremendous benefit 
to society, so much so that there is a debate within business 
ethics about whether there are any moral limits to markets. 
Given the benefits, and thinking just of those markets consti-
tuted by a stream of voluntary transactions between mutually 
consenting parties, it can be hard to even imagine how a 
market would in any sense be immoral or impermissible. At 
the same time, though, most of us find the idea of markets 
in kidneys, or sex, or nuclear weapons somehow repugnant. 
Markets in these and certain other goods strike many as cor-
rupting, exploitative, or to express a form of disrespect. So, 
the questions at the heart of the so-called ‘limits of markets’ 
debate in business ethics is, first, whether there are any lim-
its on what can permissibly be bought and sold, second, 
precisely what those limits are, and third, what considera-
tions lead us to draw the line where we do.
Many within business ethics (and society at large) argue 
that such a line can be drawn; there are ethical limits to 
markets. Moreover, this often involves goods or services 
where it is okay to have or do these things for free; there 
is just something bad about selling them. So, for example, 
while all of us agree that consenting adults can permissibly 
engage privately in sex acts, many of us feel that adults can-
not permissibly sell sex.
In Markets without Limits, however, Jason Brennan and 
Peter Jaworski argue to the contrary. They argue that, for any 
good or service, as long as it is permissible to give it for free, 
then it is permissible to give it for money. Answering the 
apparent objections to various unsavory markets at length, 
they suggest that as long as a successful market is possible 
(as long as it can be regulated to avoid exploitation or other 
bad elements), then we are permitted to pursue it. Brennan & 
Jaworski make a compelling case, and they have continued 
to do so in response to a number of recent objections. Here, 
however, I will provide a challenge to their lucrative thesis 
sometimes gestured towards but never quite fully articulated.
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The intuition behind the challenge is that markets can be 
dangerous and hard to control. Even if Brennan & Jaworski 
are right in arguing that if something can be permissibly 
sold, that there is some possible way of arranging a market 
for it that would be acceptable, it is not clear that we are 
going to get that version of the market if we try. A morally 
appropriate market for some good may be possible, but not 
feasible. And this provides a substantive constraint on our 
activity in pursuing markets.
To this end, in the first section I lay out more explicitly 
Brennan & Jaworski’s controversial view and its motivation. 
Although the view suggests a presumption in favor of pursu-
ing new markets, in the second section I show how the pos-
sible danger of prospective markets together with the open 
question of the feasibility of moral markets undermine this 
presumption. I argue that feasibility is a limit on markets. 
Then, after carefully disambiguating the Markets without 
Limits thesis in the third section, I show how this limit of 
feasibility can be used in an argument against it. Having 
laid out this argument, I consider several replies. Answering 
them uncovers the specific danger of these markets and the 
relevance of feasibility, but it leaves open the question of 
what we should actually do when confronting the issue of 
pursuing an infeasible but possibly beneficial market. Thus, I 
conclude by considering a number of ways to proceed given 
infeasibility.
The paper is structured broadly as a challenge to the cen-
tral claim in Brennan & Jaworski’s book. This seems appro-
priate insofar as that claim marks a significant view in the 
field, with several other full-length articles addressing it. 
However, the purview of this article is broader than a mere 
response to Brennan & Jaworski, or even as a new objection 
to a central view on this topic. This article will additionally 
serve as the beginning of a discussion of determining how 
the feasibility of various market conditions is relevant to 
when and how we should pursue market solutions. Feasibil-
ity as an object of study has only recently gained popularity 
within political philosophy. This article serves to introduce 
the work done on that topic to this debate and to business 
ethics generally. When thinking about the ethics of markets, 
we need to be thinking not only about the ethics of particular 
transactions or of various regulations, but about the risks 
involved in the systemic changes we might try to make.
Markets Without Limits
Much of the previous limits of markets debate involved argu-
ments surrounding the permissibility of particular markets. 
For example, Holder (1985) argues against markets for sur-
rogates in particular, as does Anderson (1990, 2000). Further 
authors such as Radin (1996), Held (2002), Satz (2010), and 
Sandel (2012) have argued against the commodification of 
sexual labor, child labor, kidneys, votes, the right to name 
babies, and any number of conceivably commodifiable indi-
vidual goods. We are left with a broad array of concerns 
about how markets introduce the opportunity for certain 
wrongs (e.g., exploitation, corruption) or constitute various 
wrongs (e.g., that they are disrespectful).
Brennan & Jaworski (op. cit.) set themselves up to argue 
against these ‘anti-commodification theorists.’ Their book 
aims to address the concerns of their opponents as a part of 
the defense of their own thesis:
“Markets without Limits: If you may do it for free, 
then you may do it for money.” (10).
There are many things Brennan & Jaworski admit that 
it is impermissible to buy and sell. It is wrong to buy or 
sell child pornography or nuclear weapons or to hire assas-
sins. But these are also things that it is wrong to have or do 
for free. One should not have child pornography or murder 
someone, and so it is not okay to pay others for these things. 
Brennan & Jaworski are careful to note that their opponents 
in this debate are not concerned about the sale of things eve-
ryone knows to be bad to have, but with the idea of markets 
for goods that otherwise it is not wrong to have or use.
Crucially, Brennan & Jaworski are also careful to avoid 
what they call ‘incidental’ limits on markets. There is noth-
ing inherently wrong with selling baseball cards, but it 
would be wrong to do so if you happened to have promised 
your brother that you would not. Of course, what is wrong 
in this case is not engaging in a market for baseball cards 
per se, but breaking your promise. Similarly, there is noth-
ing inherently wrong with selling your car, but it would be 
wrong to sell your car right now if your child needed to go 
to the hospital (14).
This caveat is critical for their argument. They go on to 
argue that when it is bad to engage in some market, what is 
bad is not merely having the market for that good. If engag-
ing in the market is even bad to begin with (and its apparent 
badness is not simply a product of our inappropriately feel-
ing disgust), then it is likely bad because of how we have 
chosen to set up the market in question, not simply that we 
have set up such a market.
For each objection to particular repugnant markets, Bren-
nan & Jaworski show how the bad-making features of these 
markets is a matter of how opponents are imagining that the 
markets in question incidentally happen to be structured. 
As such, these features can be undercut by structuring the 
market in different ways meant to avoid the problems. Key 
to their optimism is an appreciation for the sheer volume of 
ways in which market interactions can occur. On this point, 
Brennan & Jaworski draw an interesting analogy:
Markets are a bit like guitar amplifiers. Just as gui-
tar amps have various knobs (gain, volume, bass…
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etc.), so markets might have a range of variables that 
can be put to different settings. Just as some guitar 
amps sound good only on very specific settings, some 
markets might be good only on very specific settings. 
(2015a:39)
Markets can vary depending on the participants, the 
means of exchange, the price, the mode of exchange, and in 
many other ways, suggesting literal thousands of possible 
ways of structuring any given market. The implication is that 
this bounty of market structures increases the likelihood that 
there will be certain ways it that will be both permissible and 
beneficial to society. And they suggest that as long as one 
of those market structures avoids the problems suggested by 
anti-commodification theorists, then they have shown that 
it is permissible to make a market for this good—a market 
with the allowable structure. As they say,
It won’t be enough for them to show us that some mar-
kets are bad—morally impermissible—on some or 
even many “settings”. They need to show us that mar-
kets in certain commodifies are bad on all the possible 
settings. Otherwise, if we can find even one “setting” 
for a particular market, then our thesis stands. (40)
If they are right, the bar is very high for anti-commodifi-
cation theorists. If there is just one right way of facilitating a 
market in kidneys, say, but our having a market in kidneys of 
that structure would both not wrong anybody and would save 
the lives of thousands of people annually, then we might well 
be obligated to make such a market. As Brennan & Jaworski 
note, that a market may only be permissible if conducted in 
very particular ways does not indicate that it would not be a 
powerfully good market to have (ibid.).
Putting all this together, it’s hard to be confident about the 
inherent wrongness of a market for any good. Sure, a market 
in kidneys might seem likely to lead to exploiting the worst-
off among us, but this may just be incidental. If we are care-
ful in thinking about who gets to participate in the market 
and how consent for participation will be demonstrated and 
so on, then our concerns may evaporate. Without consider-
ing all of the possible market structures (or at least a signifi-
cant number of them), it would seem to be impossible for 
anti-commodification theorists to demonstrate that a market 
is inherently wrong. Given that Brennan & Jaworski them-
selves go through many of the seemingly most problematic 
markets to argue for ways that they could be structured to be 
morally acceptable, this provides solid inductive grounds for 
concluding that where it is permissible to have some good, 
there will be morally acceptable ways to sell it.
In this way, the Markets without Limits thesis appears 
to deliver on a central idea motivating Brennan & Jawor-
ski, that there is nothing bad about markets as such. Selling 
something instead of just giving it away does not (in itself) 
change the moral landscape. As they say, “…the market does 
not transform what were permissible acts into impermissible 
acts. It does not introduce wrongness” (ibid., emphasis in 
original). This is an important point for them. At times it 
can feel that there is something nefarious, evil, or at least 
unsavory about markets such that we really should avoid 
them if we can. They are not things to be proud of; they 
are elements of inherent alienation. With that perspective in 
mind, Brennan & Jaworski provide a welcome and necessary 
point of view, reminding us about the power of our markets 
for tremendous good.
Two Disanalogies Towards a Limit
If the Markets without Limits thesis is vindicated, and with 
the benefits of markets foregrounded, we are left with what 
feels like a strong presumption in favor of pursuing markets. 
Even where they may feel repugnant, we can trust that there 
will be ways of structuring those markets that avoids moral 
hazards and secures some payoff. Further, if we grant that 
markets do not ‘introduce wrongness,’ this gives the impres-
sion that it is relatively costless (morally at least) to imple-
ment markets. So, why not go ahead and introduce them?
Despite this impression, I do not think such a presumption 
is justified. To see why, I want to recognize two disanalogies 
with the original analogy concerning guitar amps. Consider 
again that analogy: There are many settings for amps, and 
some amps only sound good on particular settings. And so 
it is with markets. There are many market structures, and 
certain markets may only be good with particular structures.
First, this analogy conceals just how dangerous markets 
can be. If you pick the wrong guitar amp setting, it’s not a 
big deal. You may experience some discomfort when you 
strum those first notes, but you can trust that your mis-
take will not lead to something as grave as children being 
exploited for sex. When we are thinking about these mar-
kets, however, this is the kind of serious issue that we are 
concerned about – that legalizing prostitution may lead to 
child sex trafficking; that legalizing kidney sales may lead 
to coerced organ harvesting. Perhaps the dangers associ-
ated with every repugnant market are not so grandiose, but 
the general idea is that pursuing a market in a good can 
be pretty dangerous. We are risking exploitation, unjust 
pricing, unsafe work environments, employees drawn into 
work meaningless work, customers drawn to buy worthless 
products. In other words, we risk serious harms or rights 
violations, and these are elements that must be considered. 
Brennan & Jaworski’s analogy may thus be fine-tuned to 
how amorphous and adaptable markets can be, but it is tone 
deaf to the dangers involved in pursuing them.
One feature to focus on here concerning the amount of 
danger involved is the size and speed of markets. Brennan 
& Jaworski may be right in the central thought that markets 
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do not transform the nature of transactions from morally 
acceptable to unacceptable, from right to wrong, from good 
to bad. Markets are not inherently bad things, and so mov-
ing from a free exchange to a market exchange may not be 
the kind of change that introduces wrongness or evil.1 But 
the introduction of a market does have a particular effect. 
It increases the velocity of transactions, ensuring wider 
access to the good and more participants able to transact. 
This is part of why markets can be wonderful. However, 
it also makes markets liable to amplify whatever harms or 
risks come through voluntary transactions insofar as the rate 
of transactions increases. Moreover, it will have knock-on 
effects for other parts of the market, perhaps cannibalizing 
some of the market while facilitating others.
So far, this is all just to say that the costs of failing to 
implement a moral version of a market can be high. This 
shows the significance of ensuring that the market will have 
an acceptable market structure if there is to be a market in 
the good. Again, though, we might have thought this was 
easy to secure. Brennan & Jaworski’s argument provides 
for the conclusion that there are possible good market struc-
tures, but it would not be too much of an extension for com-
modification theorists to think that there are likely many 
such market structures that would neutralize the moral issues 
for a market in a certain good. Even granting that it would 
be morally disastrous to have a market in one of these goods 
not in one of the permissible structures, the natural thought 
might have been that which market structure we implement 
is up to us; it is no more challenging to implement the per-
missible market structures than any other.
Here, there appears to be a second critical disanalogy 
with guitar amps. If we are choosing between settings on 
a guitar amp, not only is the cost low of failing to choose 
the right setting, but it is equally easy to pick one setting 
or another, and it takes minimal effort to change settings if 
a mistake is made. The way that market ‘settings’ are pre-
sented by Brennan & Jaworski, it may appear that the same 
is true of them. The market for a good can be all in cash or 
done through credit, or it can be done through a set price or 
barter. It appears that the choice is ours. But this appear-
ance is misleading. It may be much easier for us to make a 
market that is all done through cash (since we will not have 
to work with credit card companies). Or it may be harder to 
make a market that is entirely done through bartering in a 
western economy.
Ways of making and maintaining markets generally can 
be easier or harder. And making a market in some particular 
way can be quite difficult, as can remaking a market once 
constituted in a specific way. Since markets consist in many 
transactions rather than one, controlling a market as a collec-
tive endeavor is that much harder. For us to make a market 
even for guitar amps regulated in some particular way will 
be much more challenging than my action of changing the 
setting on my amp.
To avoid looming harms, markets may have to be very 
carefully constructed. And it’s not just that they have to be 
construed precisely. How they must be constructed may be 
fairly challenging to achieve. A market for sex, for instance, 
would presumably require a significant amount of regulation 
and enforcement. We would need just the right set of rules 
to avoid horrible human rights abuses. This would likely 
require new regulatory bodies or watchdog organizations 
poised to create incentive structures and enforcement mecha-
nisms to ensure compliance. We would need to create paths 
for whistleblowers within the industry and to ensure that 
industry participants could not unduly influence their regula-
tors. We would even need extralegal, cultural mores around 
virtues and vices in this market, taboos and best practices. 
The list goes on.
Given just how much is likely required to avoid the moral 
hazards of certain markets, we cannot take it for granted 
that we will end up with a moral version of those markets 
if we try to implement them. There may be clear barriers to 
the proper implementation of these moral market structures 
along many dimensions, and the looming immoral versions 
of the market may be catastrophic. Thus, it is a live question 
whether the moral versions of these markets are achievable.
This sense of the importance of achievability suggests a 
natural limit on the permissibility of markets. What I want to 
offer is that it is plausibly captured in terms of the recently 
much-discussed concept of feasibility. Where the question 
is whether it is feasible to construct a market for a good in 
a market structure that avoids wrongdoing, we can see the 
following limit: If a morally acceptable version of a market 
is infeasible, then we are not permitted to construct it.2
1 To provide some skepticism even on this point, note that many in 
this debate (especially fans of commodification) accept some version 
of consequentialism, but act-consequentialists evaluate particular act-
tokens on the basis of their actual or expected consequences; they do 
not evaluate act-types. So, there will be no sense to be made of the 
question of whether market transactions in general are less moral than 
non-market transactions. Each transaction is evaluated separately. If 
introducing a market doesn’t change the valence of a transaction, then 
it is only because nothing does.
2 On tricky point here that should be acknowledged is that, as we will 
see, those working on feasibility disagree about whether an infeasi-
ble state of affairs is one that you have an ability to bring about. If it 
is not, as many would say, then it is slightly unclear what we would 
mean by being permitted to engage in or construct a market. Some-
one might object: If the infeasible is something that we simply can-
not do, then why not think we are permitted to do it after all but can-
not? I cannot dunk a basketball, but I am perfectly permitted to, for 
instance. In response, notice that I might not be permitted to dunk the 
basketball if I can only dunk the basketball if I try and I am not per-
mitted to try (say, because I will hurt myself if I try). There are times 
when it is perfectly fine to try to do something that you do not other-
wise have a general ability to do. If these markets are infeasible, how-
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Scholars have long been sensitive to the issue of what is 
practically achievable or feasible,3 but political philosophers 
and theorists have recently taken more care to explicate this 
generally intuitive concept of feasibility (Gilabert & Law-
ford-Smith, 2012; Lawford-Smith, 2010, 2013; Southwood, 
2018). Gilabert & Lawford-Smith (op. cit.:809) give a first-
pass characterization of the notion when they say, “Roughly, 
a state of affairs is feasible if it is one we could actually bring 
about.” Of course, this rough characterization could be taken 
any number of ways.
One way of thinking about feasibility and a feasible pol-
icy is to contrast it with this idea from above of a policy’s 
being merely possible in the broadest sense. A feasible 
policy, then, would be one which is possible in some more 
restricted sense. For instance, Wiens (2015a) suggests that 
feasibility is a matter of a state of affair’s being possible 
given our current stock of resources (institutionally, techno-
logically, motivationally, etc.). Nailing down the exact delin-
eation of these resources is a large challenge. However, once 
we think about not only what we have in society concretely 
but in terms of political capital and political will, it is fairly 
intuitive to judge when policies appear clearly beyond our 
current resources.
Another way of understanding feasibility would be to tie 
it closely with our understanding of ‘ability’ and to think 
of what is feasible roughly in terms of what we are collec-
tively able to do. Thinking of it this way, we can recognize 
that there is a long literature within the philosophy of action 
that attempts to analyze having an ability conditionally (see 
Maier, 2018). As the simple conditional analysis goes: S has 
the ability to A iff S would A if S tried. So, as an approxima-
tion: a policy is feasible iff we would successfully imple-
ment it if we tried. Understanding feasibility in this way 
also has challenges.4 However, it also promises a way of 
using information about our abilities to judge the feasibility 
of various policies.
It is not my aim here to settle on the right account of 
feasibility. Indeed, we may agree with Hamlin (2017) or 
Chahboun (2017) that there are distinct notions of feasibility 
worth distinguishing. And there are more questions about 
feasibility to answer besides. For instance, there is an ongo-
ing discussion of whether feasibility as a concept is binary 
or scalar – whether something is feasible/infeasible full-stop 
or whether feasibility comes in degrees, or whether this cap-
tures two senses of feasibility (as Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 
[2012] suggest).5
Regardless of the exact account we take on, it seems 
apparent that feasibility will be in some way normatively 
significant.6 In particular, feasibility is often understood to 
be a constraint on justice, the idea being that justice can-
not demand what we cannot deliver. Scholars have debated 
the merits of this kind of idea, but we can see how it natu-
rally extends to provide the constraint on markets suggested 
above. Unless a morally acceptable version of a market is 
feasible, we are not permitted to construct it.7
Interpreting the Thesis Towards an Objection
What exactly does the foregoing mean for the Markets with-
out Limits thesis? Insofar as feasibility is a limit on markets, 
3 For instance, Räikkä (1998: 27) begins by citing Kant, in his 1793 
essay “On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It 
Does Not Apply in Practice,” as sensitive to this distinction and (char-
acteristically) unmoved by it.
4 One challenge that comes up involves cases where it seems that 
we as a society are certainly able to implement a policy if we try, yet 
we judge it to be infeasible because we are unlikely to try (or can-
not muster the will to try) (Southwood 2018: 3). (These cases cor-
respond to Lehrer [1968]’s challenge for the conditional analysis of 
ability, where an agent is taken to have the ability, yet has a patho-
logical aversion to trying the act in question.) Proponents of this kind 
of account have responses here (Lawford-Smith 2010: 112–3), but we 
need not assess them. I point to this because it possibly broadens the 
scope of infeasibility. If we agree that an inability to muster the politi-
cal will to implement a policy marks that policy as infeasible, then 
5 I favor the scalar view found Lawford-Smith (2010, 2013) and 
Brennan (2013); however, taking on a scalar conception complicates 
matters slightly. No policy will be infeasible full-stop, and so we can-
not simply say that the moral versions of markets in some good are 
infeasible full-stop and so should not be engaged in. However, it is 
not hard to imagine that certain market structures are relatively infea-
sible and cross some threshold for being intolerably so, though there 
may be debate about the precise location of the threshold. How we 
understand these issues is significant for decision-making in this con-
text, but I will ignore them here, as they distract from the main points 
of the paper.
6 Exactly how it is normatively significant is a matter of debate (see 
Southwood 2018: 5–7). It may be that we should use our judgements 
of feasibility to aid in practical deliberation about what to do politi-
cally (Southwood 2016) rather than trying to be guided by our politi-
cal ideals (Wiens 2015b). Others are skeptical that feasibility can play 
this role (McTernan 2019). We will return to this question in the final 
section.
7 I will argue that commodification theorists should accept this con-
straint, but of course this constraint can also be accepted by those 
who reject Brennan & Jaworski’s arguments in other ways. For exam-
ple, Stein (2019) does not grant the inductive argument leading to the 
conclusion that there are possible moral markets for all goods that it 
is permissible to have for free. For those goods that do have possible 
moral markets, we can still be constrained by whether those markets 
are feasible.
ever, I will say that we are not permitted to try to implement them, 
and from this we can infer that we are not permitted to implement 
them. See Hughes (2018), which takes it to be absurd to think that the 
permissibility of performing some action follows from not being able 
to perform that action.
Footnote 2 (continued)
even simple policies that seem well within our ability will count as 




it clearly indicates that Markets without Limits is false. But 
how exactly? The thesis may be called ‘Markets without 
Limits,’ but it does not actually state that there are no limits 
on markets. Thus, our question is how the considerations 
raised provide an objection to the thesis, or whether the 
arguments given by Brennan & Jaworski secure the Markets 
without Limits thesis after all. How we answer this depends 
on how we interpret the thesis itself, and the right way to do 
so requires engaging with a bit more work in linguistics and 
philosophy of language than one might expect.
Take another look at the thesis. It seems to assert some-
thing straightforward: It’s permissible to sell goods that it’s 
permissible to have. But, what, like right now? Am I permit-
ted to sell my kidney today, for instance, since it is permis-
sible for me to donate my kidney? That does not seem right; 
it is illegal for me to sell my kidney. Assuming an obligation 
to obey the law, I am not permitted to sell my kidney.8
This confusion is answered by recognizing that within 
the thesis lies a generic. Linguistically, generics “…express 
generalizations, but unlike quantified statements, generics do 
not carry information about how many members of the kind 
of category have the property” (Leslie & Lerner, 2016). Cru-
cially, propositions expressing generics may tell us some-
thing that is only sometimes and not always the case. For 
example, it’s true “Birds fly” and “Chickens lay eggs,” even 
though not all birds fly (e.g., penguins), and only female 
chickens lay eggs.9
When we say of some activity that it is permissible, what 
is often left sotto voce is an acknowledgement that the same 
behavior could technically be done in ways that are imper-
missible. Given that I have a license, it is true to say that I 
am permitted to drive. But, of course, I am not permitted 
to drive illegally. The permission to drive admits of excep-
tions. Applying this to the thesis, we can see that although 
the thesis tells us that it is permissible to sell the goods that 
it is permissible to have, the thesis does not commit us to the 
claim that, for some good that it is permissible to have, that 
it is always permissible to sell it.
So far, this is all to the good for Brennan & Jaworski. 
Their discussion of the incidental features that lead markets 
to go wrong shows that they do not want to be committed 
to the claim that if you may do it for free, then you always 
may do it money. They can accept something weaker, that 
these markets are only permissible a certain proportion of 
the time. The problem comes from determining what propor-
tion of the time these markets would need to be permissibly 
pursued to vindicate the thesis as they really intend it.
As we saw, Brennan & Jaworski suggest that the thesis is 
vindicated if there is a single permissible version of the mar-
ket. On one reading, that’s right. If you say, “Birds lay eggs,” 
and I respond, “Mammals lay eggs too,” many of us will 
accept my response as true, though this is the exception to 
the norm for mammalian reproduction. This is the so-called 
‘existential generic,’ as discussed in Cohen (2004). Simi-
larly, if someone says, “You may have this good,” we may 
evaluate the response, “You may sell the good too,” as true 
given what Brennan & Jaworski show, that there is a version 
of that market that would be permissible. Insofar as part of 
their aim is to show that markets are not evil, the existential 
reading of the generic may be sufficient. (Look, there is a 
way to have a market in kidneys that does not infringe rights! 
So, just having of a market is not problematic.) Nevertheless, 
I suspect this is not quite what Brennan & Jaworski (or at 
least commodification theorists broadly) are after10.
For one thing, anti-commodification theorists may not 
deny the thesis so understood.11 According to Koplin (2018), 
such theorists never meant to argue for the strong view 
that certain goods should not be sold no matter the market 
8 This will not bother Brennan & Jaworski themselves: “We think it 
is permissible for you to sell a kidney. Indeed, we hope you do. (It’s 
illegal in most places to do so, but we hope you break this law if you 
can get away with it.)” (op. cit.:17). Even so, they should agree with 
the general point made below.
9 In our case, the generic is disguised and internal to the sentence. 
I am not suggesting that the whole sentence as a condition be inter-
preted as a generic. I believe Brennan & Jaworski would interpret the 
sentence ranging over all goods, not as a generalization across goods. 
They mean to say that for all goods, if you may have it for free, then 
you may sell it. Instead, my focus is on the second clause and taking 
for granted a particular good. For some particular good that you may 
have, the generic claim is that ‘you may sell that good.’ This is not 
obviously a generic claim. Typical generics involve a nominal refer-
ring to a kind being ascribed a property. As we see, the standard cases 
involve objects (e.g., dogs, radios, etc.). However, the nominals could 
refer to events as well (e.g., ‘workouts’ in “Workouts are tiring”). So, 
conforming to the style, the discussion is about the claim “Markets 
are permissible,” ascribing permissibility to markets, where ‘markets’ 
refers out our activity of creating and facilitating market transactions. 
Though there is little work at the intersection of generics and per-
missibility, it is clear from the next paragraph that there are generics 
regarding permissibility claims.
10 That they want something stronger has become clearer from sub-
sequent work. Brennan & Jaworski (2021) paraphrases their thesis 
in such a way that when considering goods it is permissible to have, 
markets structured in the right way are said to be ‘realistic and plau-
sible’. This is stronger than mere possibility, and it is suggests that 
they are likely to accept feasibility as a limit on permissible markets 
but deny the second premise in the argument against the thesis below.
11 Of course, some do. And so doing has comprised some of the 
more well-known objections to the thesis. For example, some have 
argued that the thesis is false because some things that we may do 
for free simply cannot be sold and so may not be (Dick 2017; Sparks 
2017). Others accept that these goods can be sold but argue that they 
cannot be sold in a morally acceptable manner, typically because 
certain markets express disrespect inherently (Booth 2018; Layman 
2016; Maguire & Brown 2019). These works all seem to deny the 
thesis even read as an existential generic. For responses, see Brennan 
& Jaworski (2015b, 2015c, 2016a, 2016b) and Jonker (2019), though 
the latter piece is not in favor of the Markets without Limits thesis.
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conditions. Koplin shows how a number of anti-commodi-
fication theorists (including Michael Sandel, Deborah Satz, 
Elizabeth Anderson, and several others) have endorsed (or 
not condemned) the buying/selling of things like sex and 
surrogacy in idealized circumstances (437).
More importantly, this reading is insufficient to secure 
how Brennan & Jaworski seem to want to use the thesis. One 
gets the sense in reading that they want to apply the thesis 
to purportedly repugnant markets, galvanizing us to pursue 
and implement these markets in manners that are morally 
acceptable. That is, they want the presumption discussed in 
the last section—a presumption in favor of setting up mar-
kets. And if this is not precisely what they want, then it is 
at least something a reasonable commodification theorist 
would want, as it can be convincing.12
For this reaction to be appropriate, however, it needs to 
be more than merely possible that markets in these goods 
can be structured in moral ways. These possibilities need to 
be salient possibilities, sufficiently relevant to our situation. 
As a reinterpretation of the thesis, then, I suggest reading 
it as asserting that, ‘for every good that it is permissible to 
have, it is permissible to engage in the market as it would 
typically be structured were we to construct the market while 
intentionally trying to avoid moral hazards.’
We need not argue over the details of this reinterpretation, 
as doing so involves engaging even more with the literature 
on the semantics of generics. In several ways, this interpre-
tation is favorable for the commodification theorist.13 Yet 
even the most charitable rendering of the thesis requires that 
there is at least one feasible moral version of the market for 
each good that it is permissible to have. And this just is the 
feasibility constraint from the last section. If a market is to 
be permissible on a charitable reading, then there must be 
a feasible way of constructing it morally. Implied is that if 
there is no feasible way to construct the market morally, then 
pursuing it is not permissible.
A commodification theorist needs it to be that there are 
feasible moral market structures, as it would otherwise be 
inappropriate to gesture towards these possibilities to sug-
gest pursuing them. On this point, several recent authors 
have suggested that Brennan & Jaworski have not shown 
this by arguing for the mere possibility of morally acceptable 
market structures. For example, Koplin (op. cit.) ultimately 
maintains the Markets without Limits thesis is true but prac-
tically irrelevant.14 Furthering this kind of skepticism, David 
Dick writes,
The message the market sends might cause a grave 
harm, the violation of an important right, or another 
serious moral wrong. Contingent or not, it might be 
beyond our power to successfully revise both the mes-
sage this market sends and the connection it has with 
a serious nonsemiotic moral wrong. In a case like 
this, it hardly helps to notice that these connections 
are merely contingent and could conceivably be differ-
ent in another possible world. Bullet wounds are only 
contingently lethal, but pointing this out does little to 
help those about to be shot. (2018: 235)
I think that this is exactly right. Dick is concerned that 
achieving the moral versions of these markets may be 
‘beyond our power.’ Where feasibility is interpreted in 
terms of what we are collectively able to do, another way 
of expressing this concern is to say that these markets may 
be infeasible.
This alone suggests that the Markets without Limits thesis 
has yet to be sufficiently argued for. The commodification 
theorist who wants to use the thesis to get us to go out and 
make markets has a high argumentative burden. They need 
to show generally that if you may have some good, then 
there is some morally acceptable version of a market for that 
good that is feasible. Contrarily, opponents only need good 
reason to think that there is one instance in which a good 
is had permissibly but where a morally acceptable version 
of a market for it is infeasible. Taken together, this gives us 
the means of the following argument against the Markets 
without Limits thesis:
1. If a morally acceptable version of a market is infeasible, 
then we are not permitted to construct it.
12 There is even work explicitly suggesting that generics are appealed 
to rhetorically in political contexts to convince the public (e.g., 
“Democrats want to take away your guns.”) (Abelson & Kanouse 
1966).
13 For example, we are restricting the generic to an unspoken context, 
as some scholars advocate (Greenberg 2007; Sterken 2015). When we 
say, “Birds lay eggs,” what is implied is, “[Female] birds lay eggs.” 
Here, where a commodification theorist is hypothetically asserting 
the thesis to potential market participants, the context of evaluation 
is not ‘all possible market structures,’ but as contextually restricted 
to those market structures feasible for market participants. However, 
the interpretation above is even more charitable than this. First, rather 
than considering what is true of the majority of these feasible mar-
kets, or even what is the norm of these markets (Nickel 2009), we are 
merely after what is typical or representative of this group, following 
van Rooij & Schulz (2020). Proportionally, this requires less of the 
feasible markets to be moral. We are even taking for granted that a 
representative instance of a market would be one where we are trying 
to ensure that the market is moral. That in itself is a big assumption, 
and if it cannot be met or the best reading for the Markets without 
Limits thesis involves a higher bar, then the thesis may yet be false 
even if every possible moral structure of a market is feasible.
14 Koplin accepts the thesis as technically true, but on my interpreta-
tion skepticism about the feasibility of moral versions of these mar-
kets amounts to a denial of the thesis.
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2. There is at least one good that it is permissible for you to 
have and for which it is infeasible to implement a mor-
ally acceptable version of a market for that good.
3. Therefore, there is at least one good that it is permissible 
for you to have but that you are not permitted to buy or 
sell. (The falsity of Markets without Limits.)
In the next subsections, I want to consider two natural 
replies to the argument. The first reply challenges the first 
premise. That premise offers feasibility as a limit on markets, 
and it is in some way connected to the idea of feasibility as a 
constraint on justice, but we may deny that it is such a con-
straint or that this actually does motivate the premise. These 
concerns provide an opportunity to examine the reasoning 
behind the feasibility objection.
The second reply denies the second premise; it maintains 
that moral markets in typical cases are feasible after all. I 
flesh out a few ways of giving this reply, raising challenges 
for each. Ultimately, my aim is not quite to defend the sec-
ond premise and so the argument. Instead, what I will show 
is that the burden is on commodification theorists to dem-
onstrate that it does not go through, and discharging this 
burden is challenging15. Given the stakes of implementing 
immoral markets, I think this provides for a presumption 
against introducing markets until moral versions of them 
have been shown to be feasible.
First Reply: Challenging Feasibility as a Constraint
I have suggested that that the concept of feasibility can be 
helpful in providing a constraint on moral markets. Though 
some market structure for an otherwise repugnant good 
might be extremely beneficial to society, we should not pur-
sue it if it is infeasible. And we saw above how this was in 
some way related to the idea that feasibility is a constraint 
on justice. If a policy is infeasible, the thought goes, then 
justice cannot demand that we adopt it. This is the sense in 
which feasibility is taken to offer a constraint on justice: it 
is a necessary condition on justice that just policies be ones 
that it is feasible for us to adopt.
However, as a part of a much larger conversation 
over the role of ideal or non-ideal theory within political 
philosophy,16 some scholars deny that feasibility can play 
this role of offering a constraint on justice. So-called ‘ideal 
theorists’ maintain that the demands of justice transcend 
questions of feasibility (Estlund, 2011).17 While feasibility 
may be something to consider, the infeasibility of a market 
need not be an obstacle to its permissibility. On the contrary, 
we might be obligated to pursue such a market insofar as it 
is morally superior and possible. We can trust that there is a 
system of regulations that can be discerned, legislated, and 
enforced that would constitute this moral market. There may 
be challenges to appropriately motivating us to enforce the 
right regulations, say, but these are challenges to be over-
come. They do not justify abandoning the possibility of life-
saving markets in kidneys, for instance.18
This objection may be appropriate, but in the end it is 
not very helpful or illuminating. Many among us do think 
that feasibility places a constraint on justice, it would be 
a pity if one had to be an ideal theorist in order to accept 
Markets without Limits. (Exegetically, I do not think it is fair 
to assume that Jason Brennan or Peter Jaworski themselves 
would advocate for ideal theory as a means of supporting 
their thesis.) Besides, even if one were a proponent of ideal 
theory, and infeasibility could not be used to argue against 
the permissibility of certain markets, it may still be norma-
tively significant if a market is infeasible. We may be permit-
ted to pursue them, but still gain a significant reason not to.
Another interesting, though less direct, reply is to put 
pressure on the exact connection between the impermissi-
bility of infeasible markets and the claim that feasibility is 
a constraint on justice. One natural thought is that our first 
premise is an instance of or derivable from the claim that 
feasibility is a constraint on justice; however, the connection 
between them cannot be entailment. The strongest version of 
the feasibility constraint has it that ‘ought’ implies ‘feasible;’ 
feasibility is a necessary condition for it being such that you 
ought to do something (Chahboun op. cit.) on at least some 
understanding of ‘ought’ (Southwood, 2016). But this is not 
15 Brennan & Jaworski themselves mean to place the argumentative 
burden onto anti-commodification theorists. To argue against the the-
sis, such theorists need to show that there is no morally acceptable 
way of arranging a market for certain goods, despite the myriad per-
mutations of markets. I mean to shift the burden here back onto them. 
Now, a commodification theorist will need to show us for a given 
market that a moral version of it is feasible. As discussed below, for 
certain markets the presumption seems to be that they are not, so this 
is something that will need to be argued for on a market-by-market 
basis.
16 See Valentini (2012) for context regarding the history and contours 
of this debate.
17 David Estlund is a clear example of an ideal theorist maintaining 
that justice can demand the infeasible (especially where the problem 
is simply that we cannot muster the will to implement the policy in 
question). However, others hold a relevantly similar thesis. Gheaus 
(2013) argues that feasibility is not a constraint on justice, but it 
might constraint what we ought to do. Similarly, Southwood (2019) 
allows that feasibility may not constrain justice per se but may con-
strain what we ought to do all-things-considered. This is important to 
us, because we are concerned with what we ought or are permitted to 
do, not with justice as such.
18 Such theorists may correspondingly go on to deny my interpreta-
tion of the Markets without Limits thesis, from which I argued the 
feasibility constraint follows. Instead, they may claim that what 
matters to the truth of the thesis is the mere possibility of a morally 
acceptable version of the market after all.
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to say that if something is infeasible, then you ought not do 
it. Learning that something is infeasible only tells us that 
there is no obligation to do that thing.19 It entails the absence 
of an obligation, not the presence of an obligation against 
performing an action. But if infeasibility at best implies the 
absence of an obligation, then it doesn’t on its own entail 
that you are not permitted from engaging in certain conduct, 
as the first premise claims.
It is easy to see why this would be. It may be infeasible 
that the middle school dance committee will arrive at a sin-
gle theme for this year’s Homecoming Dance, but the com-
mittee is surely permitted to try to come to a consensus on 
the matter, and not obligated to avoid pursuing a consensus 
just because it’s infeasible. That may make it inadvisable 
to pursue, but not unethical. Thus, we may worry that the 
infeasibility of our achieving the moral versions of repug-
nant markets does not make it impermissible to pursue these 
markets.
In response, I can agree that infeasibility alone does not 
entail impermissibility. Critical to seeing how it does in this 
context is to remember the relevance of the clear danger 
posed by many markets. If immoral versions of these mar-
kets are introduced (and there are many such versions), then 
the harm will be great. Even if we have a near miss and 
mis-structure the market in question just a little bit, this may 
result in great harm.20
Pursuing moral versions of these markets thus involves 
the risk of achieving one of the immoral versions of them.21 
And this risk will not typically be borne by policy-makers 
and advocates. If we attempt to make a moral prostitution 
market, we risk making a market that instead severely harms 
vulnerable populations. So, it seems that we are not permit-
ted to pursue these markets if they are infeasible, as pursuing 
the infeasible in this context brings with it these risks, and 
acting with these risks is morally unacceptable. This is just 
as premise one claims. Still, let’s use this opportunity to 
think a little bit more about why it would be true.
In thinking about how to factor in the risk involved here, 
we might be tempted to suggest that the value of pursuing 
these markets should simply be risk-adjusted. A successful 
version of the market may involve minimal harm and a mas-
sive benefit to society, but it is not guaranteed that we will 
successfully implement this version. The suggestion would 
thus be to evaluate pursuing the market not only on the basis 
of the benefits of successful implementation, but also with 
the costs of failed implementation, with the values of these 
costs and benefits adjusted on the basis of the likelihood of 
the various outcomes.22
If this were the right way to arrive at a decision about 
whether we should pursue a particular market, this alone 
is enough to tell against the Markets without Limits thesis. 
Granting that there is a morally acceptable market struc-
ture for a good is still well off from an argument that we 
are justified in pursuing it. Once we appropriately factor in 
the possible harms of pursuing infeasible policies, I doubt 
the presumption will be that markets for all goods (that it’s 
permissible to have for free) will be judged permissible. 
Pursuing many markets remains risky, and these risks can 
be significant.
However, I am skeptical that this is even how we should 
be thinking about the decision at hand. For one thing, as is 
well-known in decision theory, we tend to be risk averse, and 
our risk aversion complicates if not invalidates this standard 
decision-theoretic model for how to make decisions under 
risk (e.g., Allais, 1953; Buchak, 2013). More to the point, 
though, it does a disservice to treat the kinds of harm at issue 
as something to be simply tallied up and weighed against 
the benefits.23
It is not just that we run a risk of harming individuals by 
pursuing infeasible markets. We may well think that impos-
ing that risk of harm itself constitutes a kind of wronging. It 
seems wrong for me to do something that risks your life, and 
there has been a recent flourishing of work on how to think 
about the ethics of imposing risk on others (Athanassoulis 
& Ross, 2010; Bovens, 2019; Hayenhjelm & Wolff, 2012). 
For example, imposing risks has been construed in terms of 
23 Tenenbaum (2017) argues at length that deontological theorists 
should not accept models of decision-making under risk that simply 
weighs the choices on the basis of the probability of the risks actual-
izing. If commodification theorists are themselves working within a 
consequentialist framework, then they may be unmoved by these con-
siderations, and this is why I began by arguing that their view is chal-
lenged even using a standard cost–benefit analysis.
19 If ought(x) → feasible(x), then ¬ feasible(x) → ¬ ought(x) (not: 
ought(¬ x)).
20 This is again not to say that the danger posed by every market 
(even every repugnant market) is so great. But the danger posed will 
occasionally be substantial, and the argument against Markets without 
Limits will go through even so.
21 As Margaret Radin at one point notes: “…we must evaluate the 
seriousness of the risk if commodification proceeds” (1987:1922).
22 If a reader is particularly suspicious of feasibility as a concept, 
they may have wondered why likelihood itself could not be used as 
the relevant constraint on markets from the start. That is, if a good 
is permissible to have, it may be impermissible to sell if the likeli-
hood of selling it without moral problems is high and the moral cost 
of failure is high as well. For the reasons given in this paragraph of 
the text, I agree and think that this is a way that the project could have 
been pursued. I have chosen to work in terms of feasibility, however, 
because it’s a more nuanced concept, a fair amount has been written 
about it that we can leverage, and these concepts can come apart in 
ways that suggest feasibility as the more important limit on markets. 
In particular, we might think that a market can be infeasible and not 
to be pursued even if it is true that we are likely to successfully imple-
ment it if we try. This may happen if, for instance, we cannot muster 
the will to try.
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infringing rights, rights not to have certain risks imposed 
on us (Hansson, 2003; Oberdiek, 2017; cf. Holm, 2016).24
Agreeing that for some good there is a market structure 
that would not violate any rights if it were to be executed, 
the point is that pursuing that market in the current economic 
and political environment may well violate certain rights. 
We have rights not only against being harmed but being 
imperiled in various ways. Pursuing a market that could 
easily end in mass exploitation would constitute such an 
imperiling. Thus, we should not do it; we are not permitted 
to pursue a market when it is infeasible that we will be able 
to implement the moral version of it.25
Second Reply: Challenging the Infeasibility of Moral 
but Repugnant Markets
If it really would be infeasible to implement a version of a 
market in kidneys, say, that avoids the massive harms likely 
to accompany any such market, then perhaps we are not per-
mitted to pursue it. But is it infeasible? I think Brennan & 
Jaworski themselves are likely to push back on this very 
point. Generally, a commodification theorist may main-
tain that there is nothing so infeasible about moral market 
structures.
Taking kidneys as an example, though there are possi-
ble problems with a market in kidneys, Brennan & Jawor-
ski think that there are concrete and plausible steps we 
can take in the design of such a market to avoid them (op. 
cit.:206–207). As they suggest: To avoid exploitation, we 
could prohibit selling your kidney if you make less than 
a certain amount of income. To avoid coercion, we could 
institute a Universal Basic Income (UBI). To maintain the 
sanctity of the body, we could mandate various practices 
around the sale of kidneys. To ensure fair access, we could 
institute a lottery system for who would be eligible to buy 
the kidneys. There may be genuine moral concerns raised 
by the prospect of a market in kidneys, but none of them, as 
far as Brennan & Jaworski can tell, cannot be met with clear 
and even uncomplicated regulation.26
Are they right? Well, let’s stick with the example of kid-
neys and consider it. First, I am skeptical that the needed 
regulations would be this simple. More regulations will of 
course be required, as well as regulatory bodies, enforce-
ment agencies, audit mechanisms, legal infrastructure to 
provide compensation for abuses, cultural practices to dis-
incentivize deviance, and so on. Perhaps much of this could 
be extended from systems already in place, and perhaps not. 
Even if we had sufficient and fairly simple policies in hand, 
though, their simplicity only marks surpassing one hurdle 
to their proper implementation.
The real challenge is not to the simplicity of the neces-
sary regulations. After all, a ninety percent tax on inherited 
wealth or a law that bans swearing are simple enough, but 
how feasible are they? A policy may be perfectly simple, 
communicable, understandable, yet absurd. From the per-
spective of the current global economy, political environ-
ment, regulatory regime, and so on, it is my sense that many 
24 Being willing to impose these risks also sends a bad signal – our 
attempting to create these markets despite the risks signals if not con-
stitutes a lack of respect for the people at most risk of being harmed. 
As with other semiotic concerns, this could perhaps be mitigated in 
a number of ways: ensuring that the regulations account specifically 
for possibly harmed populations, involving members of those popula-
tions as stakeholders into the regulation formation process, etc. So, I 
do not take this to offer a new kind of objection. However, we need to 
be thinking not only of what those markets would mean and whether 
that meaning can be changed, but about what it means to pursue those 
markets when so doing is infeasible and dangerous.
25 A final challenge worth considering concerning this premise 
involves judgments of relative feasibility. Sure, it may be granted that 
the markets in question are dangerous and infeasible, but is a moral 
market in prostitution, say, any more infeasible than having no prosti-
tution? At present, we fully recognize the prevalence of black market 
prostitution, and so we might think that a system of regulation and 
enforcement that fully curtailed prostitution is no less infeasible than 
a system of regulations and enforcements that allowed for a moral 
version of prostitution. This could be put as a challenge to the first 
premise if we thought that (1) we cannot do nothing, (2) our only pos-
sibly permissible options are to pursue a moral market in sex or to 
pursue eradicating the black market, and (3) pursuing eradicating the 
black market is even more infeasible. Then, we may think that pur-
suing the moral market is permissible after all despite being infea-
sible. This is an interesting line of thought, and certainly a situation 
we might take ourselves to be in. It need not challenge the premise, 
however. I would maintain that it is still impermissible to pursue the 
moral market, even if all-things-considered we ought to pursue it 
because our other options are even worse. This involves employing 
the second proposal offered in the final section for what to do in the 
face of infeasibility.
26 There is a version of this objection worth acknowledging, though 
we lack space for a full discussion. Someone could encounter the 
Markets without Limits thesis, read it individualistically about their 
particular conduct, and be puzzled about the infeasibility. If I can 
choose to have a child for free, then why can’t I choose to have a 
child for money? There may be certain restrictions that we need as 
a society to ensure that everyone is doing it as freely and happily as I 
am, but in my own case it seems like there is nothing infeasible about 
doing it successfully.
 The Markets without Limits thesis is appealing but misleading inso-
far as it leads to this individualist take. (At points, Brennan & Jawor-
ski themselves seem to read it this way.) We must remember, though, 
that we are talking about the permissibility of a market for a good, 
not the permissibility of individual, one-off transactions. The ‘you’ in 
the thesis really refers to us, what we are permitted to do as a col-
lective endeavor. This recognition that we are talking about markets 
rather than individual transactions has consequences for this debate 
(see Semrau 2017), and in this case the consequence is that it affects 
the feasibility of buying and selling the good morally. Sure, I can do 
it, but can we?
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of the repugnant markets at issue are infeasible in this deeper 
sense.
For any market, we should recognize that the feasibility 
of acceptable versions of it depends on the feasibility of the 
various policies that we would need to implement to facili-
tate it. But then we have to ask: How feasible are these indi-
vidual policies? Have we ever advocated for, implemented, 
and successfully enforced policies like these in the past? 
Do we even agree with all of the policies on their own, and 
would we be happy to see them applied in other apparently 
similar contexts? Moreover, since morally acceptable ver-
sions of some of these markets will require a whole suite of 
policies meant to address different possible concerns, we 
should further wonder: If these individual policies might be 
infeasible, is it not even more infeasible to attempt to imple-
ment all of the policies necessary for facilitating a moral 
market? And to what extent does the safety of these policies 
depend on their being collectively implemented?
I will not blanketly claim that these questions cannot be 
answered in favor of pursuing a market in kidneys or any 
other repugnant market. It is hard to imagine, though, that 
the discussion is likely to come out this way. Let’s go back 
to the example of kidneys. Brennan & Jaworski offer several 
possible regulatory solutions to apparent moral problems 
with these markets. How feasible are these proposals?
Although advocacy for a Universal Basic Income has 
grown recently, many hurdles to its successful implemen-
tation remain: It has not been shown to be economically 
practical. There are still unsettled debates about whether it 
would have the desired effects, whether it is an inefficient 
allocation of government funds, or whether the government 
is even justified in using its revenue this way. So, supposing 
it is true that UBI is an appropriate allocation of government 
funds and would have the desired results, we would still need 
to become confident ourselves that this is the case, convince 
the public, and bring it into law. As a policy, then, UBI does 
not seem terribly feasible.27
We could say the same thing about the policy of disallow-
ing economically disadvantaged citizens from selling their 
kidneys. This policy is simple, but what precedence is there 
for a policy like this? Apart from needing a certain amount 
of money to get a mortgage, or laws requiring you to buy 
lottery tickets with cash, I cannot think of one. And how 
feasible is it to make a restriction like this but to do it just for 
kidneys? Wouldn’t the introduction of such a regulation be 
much more sweeping, causing us to rethink other markets? 
If we say that you have to have a certain amount of money 
to sell a kidney, why not to sell blood plasma, or why not 
even to buy alcohol? These cases do seem unduly paternal-
istic, but we would need a way of distinguishing the unduly 
from the acceptably paternalistic policies, then we would 
again need to convince the public and properly implement 
it. Successfully engaging in this process sounds infeasible, 
and this time it also sounds dangerous insofar as it threatens 
paternalism.
Finally, we can quickly turn to the policy suggestion of a 
lottery for buyers of kidneys. There is precedence for such 
policies, so it does seem feasible. But now we have to worry 
about the dangers that arise purely from this policy, such 
as the creation of less well-regulated secondary markets 
for kidneys. Without the right further policies in place, this 
policy will only forestall high prices for kidneys, and the 
necessary further policies may themselves be infeasible. For 
example, we could disallow the resale of a kidney gotten 
through a lottery. However, we generally do not stop the 
resale of goods owned. So, we would again be thrust onto a 
challenging policy decision about which scholars disagree.
None of this is to suggest that the right policies aren’t out 
there. Even stipulating that they are, it is far from known is 
that such policies are feasible.28 Brennan & Jaworski quickly 
make the point that regulations for addressing this or that 
moral concern seem ready to hand (ibid.). And so, the pre-
sumption should be that there will always be some regula-
tory fix that in principle could correct for our moral concerns 
with a market. I agree. My point is that even granting this, 
we have not earned the presumption that these markets are 
feasible. The scope of the feasible is much narrower than the 
scope of the metaphysically possible. As such, the burden 
is actually on the proponents of a market for a good that 
seems repugnant to show us how a market in it is feasible 
to achieve.
For a final pushback on this point, a commodification 
theorist may resist giving the details and instead appeal to 
27 This is not to say that it’s not worth pursuing (or exploring) it. The 
cost of trying and failing to successfully implement it may be quite 
low, just a matter of the opportunity cost of how the money or time 
could have been spent, rather than any particular harm or rights viola-
tions that pursuing it would involve. As we saw, we can permissibly 
pursue infeasible policies if so doing is not dangerous in particular 
ways, and at least exploring UBI may not be.
28 This point is critical to the argument being made, and it follows 
much more quickly than indicated. I have said that pursuing these 
dangerous markets should be conditioned on their feasibility. More 
carefully, to be justified in pursuing such a market, we must at least 
be justified in believing that the good version of that market is fea-
sible. Are we likely to be so justified? If the dangers are severe, then 
the stakes are quite high. Given work on pragmatic encroachment in 
epistemology, however, the higher the stakes are concerning a prop-
osition’s truth, the harder it is for you to count as knowing or even 
being justified in believing that proposition (Fantl & McGrath 2002; 
Stanley 2005). This means that it will be quite hard to be justified in 
believing that the acceptable version of this market is feasible. We 
would need quite a bit of evidence to be justified, and this evidence 
is often lacking. Moreover, if Wiens (2014) is right, then these points 
are connected: if you cannot justifiably believe that the market is fea-
sible, it is not feasible after all.
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induction in the abstract: We have successful markets in cer-
tain goods right now that used to be thought of as repugnant. 
And so, we should infer that the markets that seem to be 
repugnant today should be viewed optimistically. We should 
expect that we can have successful markets in them, eventu-
ally ameliorating our sense of disgust. Though we cannot 
point to exact policies, the process of finding sufficiently 
good policies for repugnant markets is feasible. If this is 
right, and repugnant markets are the hard case, then we can 
infer that generally moral versions of markets are feasible.
Something similar to this approach is taken up by Bren-
nan & Jaworski (ibid.:210–214). They run through a sur-
prising list of paid professions (including laborers, teachers, 
lawyers) as well as other commodities (interest on loans, 
children’s insurance). These are things we today think 
should be paid for, but that scholars used to debate and find 
repugnant. Brennan & Jaworski are trying to undermine our 
expectation of continued repugnance once we set up a mar-
ket, but we could imagine this to also be a way of arguing 
that acceptable versions of currently repugnant markets are 
feasible.
However, I am not hopeful about this approach. South-
wood and Wiens (2016) have argued that the successful 
implementation of a policy is not a good guide to how fea-
sible it was before its implementation. This does not show 
that feasibility does not matter; instead, it suggests that, for 
these supposedly successful markets, we could have just got-
ten extremely lucky in how we implemented them, blithely 
risking moral catastrophe along the way. Perhaps we could 
disabuse ourselves of the intuition of repugnance if we were 
to successfully implement moral versions of repugnant mar-
kets. But this is not to show that achieving these versions of 
these markets is feasible from our perspective today.
Separately, it is also not clear that the markets being 
pointed to were all that successful. Don’t we still find sys-
temic abuses sanctioned if not institutionalized by the law 
for these commodities? Our system of pro bono defense law, 
for instance, is a patchwork fix as far as most of us are con-
cerned given the unfair difference in legal representation. 
These commodities may be valuable to us, and we may not 
be able to do without them at this point, but we cannot pre-
tend that we got the morally permissible versions of these 
markets. If it is true that we no longer find these markets 
repugnant29, what this shows is just that repugnance is not 
a good guide to morality, a point with which Brennan & 
Jaworski are likely to agree.
If anything, then, the past battles over commodification 
should teach us that it is feasible to commodify things in 
ways that make those markets entrenched. A battle to com-
modify sex may be a battle that we can win. But this is all 
the more reason to proceed with caution, as it is highly infea-
sible that the market we will be stuck with will be a market 
that we can accept.30
Facing Infeasibility
Consider that there may be some sense in which a novice 
can hit a bullseye; they might get lucky. Still, they are not 
permitted to throw if someone happens to be standing next to 
the dartboard. It is in this spirit that I have argued that Mar-
kets without Limits is mistaken. Perhaps we really can con-
struct a market for sex or kidneys that would avoid infringing 
anyone’s rights or facilitating massive harms. But we have 
not yet seen how pursuing these markets avoids unjustly 
imposing risks, and so we are not permitted to pursue them. 
Though an important result, what we are left with is quite 
negative. It would be fair to wonder what we should be doing 
or how we could use this information about infeasibility. To 
conclude, then, I will consider several ideas about how to 
proceed in the face of infeasibility.
First, we can note a way around the apparent impermis-
sibility of infeasible markets. The markets are impermissible 
because they risk harms to citizens, and these individuals 
have rights against having these risks imposed on them. 
However, we would be permitted to pursue these markets if 
individuals waived these rights.
If everyone agreed that a market in kidneys would be 
so beneficial that it was worth the risk, then it would seem 
permissible to pursue this market despite the risk. And the 
agreement may not need to be explicit. Driving is risky to 
both drivers and pedestrians, but we accept this risk as a nec-
essary part of living in our society. This seems so even if we 
did not ever consent to such a system explicitly. Similarly, if 
we found ourselves with a market in kidneys because a gov-
ernment representing us pursued it, then this may count as 
our collectively consenting to the risks involved. There are 
big assumptions here: This involves tying state legitimacy 
to consent of the governed, and assuming that the state is 
29 And don’t we? It may be unthinkable not to pay teachers or charge 
interest, but there is still something abhorrent about these practices. 
Teachers get paid, yes, but thinking of teachers as getting paid for 
outcomes with the student viewed as the customer is a rising terror 
of the professorate. This may be overblown, but there is something to 
it, and it involves repugnance. Similarly, we may expect to pay inter-
est. And anyone who knows anything about finance understands that 
lenders need compensation for incurring risk. Still, as those interest 
rates rise purely to compensate for the increased risk of insecure bor-
rowers, we boil over with rage.
30 This shows another way in which we might say that the morally 
acceptable versions of these markets are infeasible or impractical. For 
Weinberg (2013), practicality/impracticality is better judged through 
a process of trying out a policy, experimenting with it, and seeing 
whether and how it can work. If markets generally are sticky, how-
ever, at least in the sense that they are hard to be rid of once intro-
duced, then they are impractical in this additional sense.
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in fact legitimate. Still, this could be a way to permissibly 
pursue infeasible markets.
As a second point to make, we can see how the possibil-
ity of conflicting obligations is relevant here. Assume that 
a market for kidneys is impermissible because we have an 
obligation not to risk certain harms. Still, if a market for 
kidneys would save many lives, then we may think that we 
actually have an obligation to set up the market for it (per-
haps following from a duty to rescue). Thus, then we would 
have conflicting obligations.
As is sometimes noted, ‘ought’ does not entail ‘must’ 
(e.g., Vranas, 2018). So, our being obligated not to pursue 
the market in question may not mean that we must not pursue 
it; that obligation can be overruled by stronger countervail-
ing considerations. In the case of kidneys, if many lives will 
be saved by a market in kidneys, then perhaps we all-things-
considered ought to implement a market for kidneys. But this 
is no vindication of Markets without Limits. This is just to 
say that rather than being stalemated about how to proceed 
given this conflict, it may be that the proper course is to 
implement the imperfect market for kidneys.
Since we will have failed to meet an obligation, we may 
incur additional duties: We may have a preemptive duty to 
take precaution as we set-up the market to attempt to miti-
gate the possible damage. (See Sandin [2004] and a vast lit-
erature on how to think about a precautionary principle such 
as this.) We may also incur obligations of moral repair or 
corrective justice to compensate victims (Hayenhjelm, 2019; 
Lazar, 2008; Walker, 2006). Thus, when learning that a mar-
ket is infeasible, this may not recommend against trying to 
implement it; instead, it could warn us about what further 
steps we would need to be prepared to take to mitigate the 
damage and correct for damage caused.
Even if in the end we decide against implementing these 
markets because of their infeasibility, a final point is that this 
does not mean that the information about their infeasibility is 
useless. What counts as feasible/infeasible can change over 
time as our abilities expand or contract, as Gilabert (2017) 
recognizes. There, he suggests that the notion of feasibility 
can be used to inspire our political imagination, and that 
we can even have ‘dynamic duties’ to work to change what 
is feasible for us. I think this is right, and it follows from a 
natural but walked-back version of Markets without Limits.
When we hear the Markets without Limits thesis, there 
is something deeply appealing about it. Engaging in market 
exchanges can at times lead to tremendous societal gains, 
and there may well be versions of repugnant markets that are 
acceptable and only leave us with these gains. The problem 
is that it is not clear that these versions of the market are 
accessible to us; they aren’t feasible. But, well, they should 
be.
Given this, another version of the thesis that I would 
endorse would be the following: ‘If you may do it for free, 
and it would add tremendous value to be able to do it for 
money, then you ought to be permitted to do it for money.’ 
I take this to provide a standing obligation. We ought to 
explore policy options towards the end of making feasible 
those markets that it would provide substantial benefit to 
allow, even if at present they may seem repugnant.
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